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Article
FROM ASPIRATION TO ARROGANCE AND
BACK: THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE OF
"EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY"
UNDER TITLE VII
Barclay D. Beery1
Of course it's not true. Of course it never will be true. But I challenge anybody
to tell me that it isn't the type of goal we should try to get to as fast as we can.
- Thurgood Marshall 2
*.. the others you will meet.
They won't act as kindly if they see you on the street.
- Donald Fagen and Waiter Becker3
1. INTRODUCTION
Our grandson, Jack, has come over to visit us. We sit on the steps on
a Sunday October afternoon watching the colorful leaves blow down the
sidewalk in front of our house. Jack is in the eighth grade at one of the
schools here in town. He talks Enthusiastically about the cultural
exchange that he and his classmates have been doing as part of a
segment of their American history class on the struggle for equality and
I Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University School of Law. Special thanks to Rick
Greenstein, Barry McCarthy and Michael Yelnosky for their constructive comments on
earlier drafts, and to Franklin Snyder, Rachel Arnow Richman and Anthony Niedwiecki for
helping me shape my thoughts during the article's formative stages. Thanks also to Brad
Bingaman and Suzanne Kaplan for their research assistance and to Temple University
School of Law for its research support.
2 Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, in 115 F.R.D.
349,354 (1987), quoted in MARK TUsHNET, MAKING CIVIL RiCHTs LAW 5 (1994).
3 Steely Dan, Barrytown, on PRETZEL LOGIC (ABC Records 1974).
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civil rights. Jack says that, as a result of the exchange, he has learned
about the cultural backgrounds of his classmates, everything from food
and music to family traditions and family history. He has also learned
about some of the experiences his classmates have had with prejudice.
For example, one of his classmates talked about a recent occasion when a
car full of people shouted hateful racial remarks at him and his friend.
Another student related how her mother's co-workers had made fun of
the way she spoke English, her second language.
Jack asks me what I learned when I was growing up in history class
about cultural differences between groups and prejudice. I tell him that,
although we may have read a few things, his grandmother and I did not
really experience anything like the cultural exchange he described until
we attended an anti-racism training program as adults. The training
taught us about the perspectives of people from racial or ethnic
backgrounds different from our own. I tell Jack that I would like to have
listened more to the stories of others before I had so much to unlearn
about them.
My daughter, Leah, Jack's mother, arrives to take Jack home. She is
an executive vice president of a company in town where she is
principally involved in human resources and employee relations. For
the past several weekends, she has been coordinating bias awareness
training for the company's employees through one of the educational
organizations specializing in such training. The training is designed to
help employees become more aware of their own biases and develop
strategies for reducing the impact of these biases on others in their work
environment. At one of the previous training sessions, Leah learned that
several employees perceived the company's recently implemented
grooming policy as unfair to individuals of their particular ethnic group.
Leah said that the manager who had drafted the policy had tried to
consider all of the problems it might present for employees but had
missed the particular ethnic association identified in the training. Part of
the company-sponsored training also provides participants with an
opportunity to exchange cultural experiences, so Leah and Jack have
been able to share the stories they have heard. Leah is in a hurry to get
Jack to soccer practice, so she tells us she will call us later. I smile
proudly as I watch them walk away together.., and then my alarm goes
off. It was a good dream, but like so many I have had before, it feels
incomplete, unfinished.
"It's only a dream." My parents used to say that to comfort me after
I awakened frightened from a nightmare. The message was that,
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because the nightmare was a dream, it was nothing to worry about. Yet
like so many words in our language, "dream" has more than one
meaning. It refers to our conscious aspirations, as well as our
unconscious musings. The message we receive from our parents and
others regarding our dreams as aspirations may be the opposite of "it's
only a dream" in that we should pay attention to them and follow them.
Or it may be the same, based on the perception that the distance of our
dreams from reality renders them as meaningless as a nightmare. But
dreams as aspirations are never meaningless; they are an essential part of
the human condition and a prerequisite to our progress.4 Aspirations
inspire action, and the messages in language people receive about them
can profoundly affect whether they continue to exist as inspirational
forces or die as "former" dreams.5
This Article examines language in the law and the aspiration to
eliminate the problem of employment inequality, defined figuratively as
the contribution of employer decision making to a workplace playing
field that is more difficult for members of "outgroups" to play on than
others. The aspiration to eliminate employment inequality mirrors the
aspiration for "equal employment opportunity," defined as the level
workplace playing field. The purpose of the Article is to examine the
relationship between the message of language about Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),6 the law's principal response to the
problem of employment inequality,? and the aspiration for equal
employment opportunity. My contention is that language about the law
has replaced the aspiration in equal employment opportunity with
arrogances by sending the message that the law is the solution to the
See EZRA STOTLAND, THE PSYCHOLOGY oF HoPE 3 (1969).
See id. at 15-18.
h Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified and amended in
various sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
7 Title VII was initially drafted as a response to employment inequality as defined above.
After Adam Clayton Powell became Chair of the House Labor and Education Committee in
1961, he appointed a subcommittee on labor to hold hearings across the United States in
order to investigate and highlight inequality in employment See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
THE CIVIL RIGI-TS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT or NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 95-
96 (1990). Through these hearings, Powell and the other committee members were able to
highlight to the rest of the legislature the manner in which workplace decision-making
created obstacles to equality in employment. See id. at 96-97. Having gathered information
on a variety of employer-rooted barriers to employment opportunity, a sub-committee of
Powell's committee proposed and drafted Title VI! as a legal response. See id. at 97-98.
9 Arrogance is a word with very negative connotations. Here, arrogance is used to mean
the absence of humility. See Rex J. Zedalis, Connections: Interpretive Perspectives and Social
Attitudes, 26 SETON HALL L REV. 255, 268 (1995) ("Humility consists of an absence of
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problem of employment inequality. This message suggests to the
regulated public that compliance with Title VII is sufficient to create
workplace equality, which is a dangerous suggestion that affirms an
attitude of complacency about compliance rather than the kind of self-
examination necessary to move workplaces closer to the level playing
field ideal.
Language can effectively inspire individuals and groups to work on
a very complex problem while at the same time communicate the
problem's solution as a distant, perhaps even unreachable aspiration.
Part II of this Article discusses some examples of such language within
the struggle for civil rights which produced Title VII; it analyzes what
made the language effective in inspiring action to address the problem of
inequality without understating the strength of the psychological and
institutional forces sustaining that inequality.9 This Article then draws a
parallel between the message of civil rights language before Title VII and
the message of various groups engaged in some form of bias awareness
education today.10 These examples both provide a sense of where the
law's response to employment inequality began and demonstrate how
official language about the law in the future might communicate a
similar inspirational message about equal employment opportunity.
Part III describes how the language about Title VII has evolved to
depict the law as the solution to employment inequality.11 The
discussion begins with the seeds of this message in the language used by
various government leaders during the formative years of federal
antidiscrimination legislation and then focuses on the language of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ("EEOC"), the primary
entity charged with educating the regulated public about Title VIU.12 The
EEOC's use of language in the early years of Title VII demonstrated its
recognition of the complexity of employment inequality and contributed
to an interpretation of discrimination which covers some employer
practices that, although applicable to all, have a disproportionate
arrogance...."); Wilton Blake II, Vie African Origin of Morality, 1 How. SCROLL 1, 9 (1993)
("The opposite of humility is arrogance."). Because humility in my view represents an
aspirational quality that human beings are not capable of fully attaining, arrogance in this
usage is a common characteristic, not a description limited to those who consider
themselves beyond reproach.
9 See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 42-87 and accompanying text.
12 Under the section of Title VII which creates the EEOC, the EEOC has an educational, as
well as an enforcement, mandate. See 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-4 (1994).
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adverse effect on members of one or more of the outgroups the statute
protects. In other direct communication with the regulated community,
however, the EEOC has used language suggesting that the law solves the
problem of employment inequality, which is an arrogant claim for the
law in the face of such a complex and pervasive problem. The
emergence of equal employment opportunity ("EEO") as a familiar term
of the workplace has reinforced the message that Title VII produces
equal employment opportunity.
Regardless of whether the law itself can effectively address the
complex problem of employment inequality, Title VII, as interpreted,
does not do so. Part IV explains how the Supreme Court's interpretation
of discrimination, the conduct prohibited under the statute, establishes
the incompleteness of Title VII as a response to employment inequality. 13
The doctrinal division of discrimination into two "types" of analysis,
with no articulation of an overall wrong linking the two, allows aspects
of employment inequality that neither analysis recognizes. The role of
unconscious bias in specific personnel decisions, for example, slips
through the doctrine's focus on intent as the wrong of discrimination in
such decisions. Therefore, Title VII, as interpreted, does not and cannot
solve the problem of employment inequality.
Part V asserts that, although the incompleteness of the doctrine is
lamentable, public perception of employment inequality as a problem
fully addressed or addressable by Title VII may be a more immediate
problem than the shortcomings of the doctrine, which are now fairly well
entrenched. 14 This perception, encouraged by the language about Title
VII, affirms an attitude of complacency that directly impedes the
struggle for equality. Complacency not only blocks the kind of
improved awareness through self examination necessary to address the
roots of employment inequality that Title VII does not cover but also
threatens the progress accomplished by Title VII up to this time.'5
In Part VI, this Article suggests that, by attempting to eliminate from
official discourse about the law the language which equates the law with
equal employment opportunity, the EEOC may be able to restore the
13 See infra notes 88-145 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
15 If, for example, Sisyphus decided to stop pushing the rock up the mountain, the weight
of the rock presumably could force him down to the bottom. See generally ALBERT CAMUS,
The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Justin O'Brien trans.,
1955).
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law's EEO goal as an aspiration including, but extending beyond, Title
VII compliance.' 6 Then, hopefully, the official message about Title VII
will stop impeding existing civil rights educational efforts, and
awareness of individual responsibility for employment inequality will
begin to replace complacency as a small step in the right direction.
II. THE MESSAGE OF ASPIRATION IN THE LANGUAGE OF
THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
The historical struggle for African-American equality provides some
excellent examples of individuals and groups that have communicated
equality as an aspiration in order to inspire work for progress toward
that aspiration.17 These examples demonstrate that language addressing
a complex problem, the oppression of African-Americans, can inspire
attention to the problem without understating the problem's complexity.
Section A begins by discussing this language and analyzing how the
language succeeded in inspiring action for change while realistically
depicting the tremendous resistance to that change.'8 Section B then
briefly discusses the use of similar language in current educational
efforts directed toward increasing awareness of continuing inequality
between groups.19
The language discussed in this Part and its success in
communicating equality as an aspiration sharply contrasts with the
official language about Title VII discussed in Part III and its failure to
convey the aspiration in equal employment opportunity. The success of
the approaches discussed herein at communicating an inspirational
message, in the face of such a dauntingly complex problem, provides an
example of the kind of message the law should encourage and attempt to
emulate rather than obstruct.
16 See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
17 In this Article, the language of African-American civil rights leaders has been chosen
because it demonstrates clearly the effective communication of the elimination of a
complex problem as a distant aspiration. Discussing race in terms of a black-white
paradigm, is problematic. Moreover, the academic literature's focus on the African-
American struggle tends to present an under-inclusive picture of civil rights history. See
Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binan Paradigm of Race: The "Nonnal Science" of American
Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. RE'.. 1213, 1219, 1238 (1997) (oint symposium by California Law
Review and La Raza Law Journal).
18 See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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A. Language in the Struggle for Equality Before the Enactment of Title VII
Civil rights reform efforts, of course, focused on the problem of
inequality in the workplace and elsewhere long before the formal
recognition of a "civil rights movement."20 Frederick Douglass, a
prominent African-American voice for change in the 19th century,
described employment inequality as one of several 'unjust manifestations
of prejudice against his race. 21 Douglass connected the experience of
being excluded from employment on the basis of race to the experience
of slavery:
The workshop denies him work, and the inn denies him
shelter; the ballot-box a fair vote, and the jury-box a fair
trial. He has ceased to be the slave of an individual, but
has in some sense become the slave of society. He may
not now be bought and sold like a beast in the market,
but he is the trammeled victim of a prejudice .... 22
In linking the experiences of discrimination and slavery, Douglass
conveyed the severity of existing inequality by showing how small a step
emancipation had been toward real freedom.23
Another prominent feature of Douglass's rhetoric, that effectively
inspired without understating the severity of the problem of inequality,
20 As a matter of historical terminology, civil rights scholars have tended to focus on the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education as the starting point for the
Civil Rights Movement, recognizing that the struggle for African-American equality was a
constant in American history before that time. See DAVID LEVERING LEWIS ET AL., THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA ix (Charles W. Eagles ed., 1986).
21 See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Color Line, in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS 342-52 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955) (hereinafter Douglass, The Color Line];
Frederick Douglass, We Are Not Yet Quite Free, An Address Delivered at Medina, New
York, on August 3, 1869, ROCHESTER DAILY DEMOCRAT, Aug. 4, 1869, reprinted in 4 THE
FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS, 1864-80, at
220-40 (John W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991) [hereinafter Douglass, We
Are Not Yet Quite Free].
22 Douglass, The Color Line, supra note 21, at 344.
2- See Douglass, We Are Not Yet Quite Free, supra note 21, at 231, reprinted in 4 THE
FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS, 1864-80, at
220,231 (John W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991) ("We have been turned out
of the house of bondage, but we have not yet been fully admitted to the glorious temple of
American liberty."); Frederick Douglass, Frederick Douglass Calls on the Freemen to Organize
for Self-Protection (1883), in THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 14 (Henry Steele
Commager ed., 1967) ("Though the colored man is no longer subject to be bought and sold,
he is still surrounded by an adverse sentiment which fetters all his movements.").
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was his emphasis on the contradiction between the reality of inequality
and the country's democratic principles. When people of color were left
out of participation in the Columbian World Exposition in Chicago,
Douglass wrote the Introduction to a pamphlet of protest, in which he
included the following:
We have deemed it only a duty to ourselves, to make
plain what otherwise might be misunderstood and
misconstrued concerning us. To do this we must begin
with slavery. The duty undertaken is far from a
welcome one. It involves the necessity of plain speaking
of wrongs and outrages endured, and of rights withheld,
and withheld in flagrant contradiction to boasted
American Republican liberty and civilization.24
After Douglass, other leaders working in the cause of racial equality,
like W.E.B. DuBois, continued to apply the two techniques of grounding
the explanation of inequality in the historical experience of slavery and
contrasting the inequality with articulated national principles.25 As the
cause of racial equality transformed into a movement, the rhetoric
remained essentially the same. In 1955, just a few days after the arrest of
Rosa Parks in Birmingham for refusing to give her bus seat to a white
21 See Frederick Douglass, Introduction to the Reason WMy the Colored American is not in the
World's Colunbian Exposition (1892), in 4 THE LIFE AND WRrINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:
RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER 469, 470 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955). Douglass then went on to
discuss a number of as yet unfulfilled developments for American people of color which
would be consistent with national statements of human rights, including principles
articulated in the Declaration of Independence. See id. at 470-71.
25 Like Douglass before him, W.E.B. DuBois included in his reform efforts persuasive
communications to the broader community in an attempt to create political pressure. See
W.E.B. DuBois, An Appeal to the World (1947), reprinted in W.E.B. DuBoIs SPEAKS: SPEECHES
AND ADDRESSES, 1920-1963, at 202, 202-21 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970). In 1946, DuBois
drafted an Introduction to a document presented to the Commission on Human Rights of
the United Nations, the purpose of which was to protest the situation of African-
Americans. See id. at 202-03. Before moving into more specific facts, Dubois employed the
two rhetorical strategies of discussing inequality as slavery and contrasting inequality with
national ideals as a means of highlighting the injustice of the situation:
A nation which boldly declared "That all men are created equal,"
proceeded to build its economy on chattel slavery.., and a great
nation, which today ought to be in the forefront of the march toward
peace and democracy, finds itself continuously making common cause
with race hate, prejudiced exploitation and oppression of the common
man. Its high and noble words are turned against it, because they are
contradicted in every syllable by the treatment of the American Negro
for three hundred and twenty-eight years.
Id. at 205.
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passenger, Martin Luther King, Jr., responding to the incident, stated:
"We, the disinherited of this land, we who have been oppressed so long
are tired of going through the long night of captivity. And we are
reaching out for the daybreak of freedom and justice and equality.... 26
Like the speeches and writings of Douglass and DuBois, King's
expressions of hope for change were grounded in the experience of
oppression; but, as the movement encountered more resistance, his
description of that experience became more evocative of the complexity
of racial inequality. In responding to eight white Birmingham clergymen
who had publicly labeled the demonstrations for which King had been
arrested in April of 1963 "unwise and untimely," King stated:
I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the
stinging darts of segregation to say wait. But when you
have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers
at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim;
when you have seen hate-filled policeman curse, kick,
brutalize, and even kill your black brothers and sisters
with impunity; when you see the vast majority of your
20 million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage
of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you
suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech
stammering as you seek to explain to your six-year-old
daughter why she can't go to the public amusement
park that has just been advertised on television, and see
the tears welling up in her little eyes when she is told
that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the
depressing clouds of inferiority begin to form in her little
mental sky, and see her begin to distort her little
personality by unconsciously developing a bitterness
toward white people; when you have to concoct an
answer for a five-year-old son who is asking in
agonizing pathos: "Daddy, why do white people treat
colored people so mean?" .... then you will understand
why we find it difficult to wait.27
2 Martin Luther King Jr., Speech at Holt Street Baptist Church, (1955), in THE EYES ON THE
PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE
BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990, at 48,50 (Claybome Carson et al. eds., 1991).
27 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in THE EYES ON
THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM
443
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Through images of deeply held and destructive individual prejudice
(the mob) and institutional oppression and resistance to change (the
policemen), King persuasively advocated for change while
communicating to a white audience some of the complexity of the
phenomena contributing to racial inequality. 28
When King did touch on the appropriate public response to racial
inequality, he did not oversimplify the solution. For example, in
explaining the struggle's aspirations for workplace equality, King
conveyed the sense that creating a level playing field would be a
complex task:
The struggle for rights is, at bottom, a struggle for
opportunities. In asking for something special, the
Negro is not seeking charity .... He does not want to be
given a job he cannot handle. Neither, however, does he
want to be told that there is no place where he can be
trained to handle it. So with equal opportunity must
come the practical, realistic aid which will equip him to
seize it. Giving a pair of shoes to a man who has not
learned to walk is a cruel jest.29
THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990, at 153, 155-56 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds.,
1991).
See id. at 153-58. King also conveyed the severity of the im pact of inequality through
both large scale statistics and a vivid description of the impact of racial exclusion on the
psyche of a small child. See id. King's poetic reference to "the depressing clouds of
inferiority" was reminiscent of what was probably the first major official recognition of the
complexity of inequality, the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court based its conclusion in Brown that "[s]eparate
educational facilities (were] inherently unequal," in part on the psychological impact of the
"sense of inferiority" that the forced separation from other children placed on African-
American children. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. The Brown decision was not the first to
recognize this aspect of the complexity of inequality between racial groups. As Juan Perea
points out, Brown was preceded by Mendez v. Westmninister School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.
Cal. 1946), affid, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). See Perea, supra note 17, at 158-59. In Mendez,
the District Court judge concluded that California's segregation of Mexican-American
students violated Equal Protection, and reasoned, as the Court in Brown would eight years
later, that separation itself produced social inequality regardless of equality of facilities and
learning materials. See Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 549.
29 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 136 (1963).
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Although the language of civil rights leaders, like any language, was
subject to the interpretation of the receiver,3° the message therein
regarding equality was communicated through the experience of
inequality. 31  By communicating the psychological as well as the
economic burdens of this legacy of mistreatment, these "outside" voices
provided a rich "inside" perspective on racial inequality. At the same
time that their rhetoric depicted a severe problem in need of immediate
legal attention, it also described a complex problem insusceptible to a
simple or immediate solution.
B. A Current Parallel in Communihj Education
The work of communicating and promoting greater understanding
of the inequality experienced by outgroups has been a continuing aspect
of the struggle for civil rights up to the present.32 For example, a number
of community organizations have developed some form of bias
awareness education as a means of building bridges and encouraging
progressive work toward equality.33 Although each anti-racism or bias
awareness program differs somewhat in the specific content of the
information presented and the format of the presentation, training
generally includes a substantial presentation of the perspective of
victims of inequality on the forces which contribute to their oppression
and an opportunity for participants to exchange stories regarding their
0 See Stephen L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2252-53 (1989) (describing how the
communication of narrative meaning depends on the reader's interpretation).
31 King also, of course, frequently spoke about equality in the language of faith. See
ANDREW MICHAEL MANIS, SOUTHERN CIVIL RELIGIONS IN CONFLICT 74 (1987) (quoting King
as saying that "God has marvelous plans... for this nation and we must have faith to
believe that one day these plans will materialize."). Cf. David Luban, Difference Made Legal:
The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2194 (1989) (asserting that King placed the
message of the Civil Rights Movement side-by-side with passages of The Bible in his
"Letter from Birmingham City Jail").
32 Government publications created in association with President Clinton's Race Initiative
have attempted to highlight the work of various national and local organizations actively
engaged in building bridges of understanding between groups. See ADVISORY BOARD'S
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE
ON RACE, app. H1 (Sept. 1998).
-3 See id. One of the organizations with a national presence in diversity training is the
Anti-Defamation League ("ADL"). See id. at app. HI-1. Before the enactment of federal
civil rights legislation, the ADL cooperated closely with the major African-American led
civil rights organizations in the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, the major political
lobbying force of the civil rights coalition. See GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 95.
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own personal experiences with prejudice. 34  Training or education
usually includes diversity of both trainers and participants so that the
presentation by the trainers and the exchange by the participants will
involve an exposure to diverse personal stories of prejudice and its
impact.35
Although the precise language used in bias awareness training
fluctuates depending on who is facilitating the training, the message of
the training's content is consistent with the reality that inequality
3 See, e.g., JOSEPH BARNDT, DISMANTLING RACISM 29-30 (1991); LOUISE DERMAN-SPARKS &
CAROL BRUNSON PHILLIPS, TEACHING/LEARNING ANTI-RACISM: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 3-5, 70-76, 97-102, 106 (1997); JUDITH H. KATZ, WHITE AWARENESS: HANDBOOK
FOR ANTI-RACISM TRAINING 61-91 (1978). In the "Big Foot. Analysis" developed by the
People's Institute for Survival and Beyond, a national organization of trainers based at 1444
North Johnson Street, New Orleans, LA 70116, the various institutions which contribute to
oppress racial minority communities are described, based on interviews of individuals
living in those communities, as the feet that are "kicking [their] community in the behind."
Barndt, supra at 29-30.
A parallel within legal academic discourse to this perspective-based approach to
education has been the scholarly effort to communicate the complexity of outgroup
inequality by writing stories or "narratives" which provide the perspective of oppressed
citizens on the many forces which contribute to their experience of oppression. Jane B.
Baron and Julia Epstein have divided the storytelling movement in legal scholarship into
three strands. See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Language and the Law: Literature, Narrative,
and Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 662-79 (David Kairys ed., 1998). The first of these
strands, which they call the "strategic" strand, employs the use of stories as a means of
more effectively communicating the nature of a problem like, for example, unconscious
discrimination. See id. at 668-69. The other two strands, referred to as the "evidentiary"
and "multiple realities" strands, involve the use of stories to demonstrate the particular
failings of the law and to challenge the notion that there is an objective truth for the law to
address, respectively. See id. at 669. The narrative strand, which I refer to here as a parallel
in both content and delivery to the message of early civil rights leaders and bias awareness
educators, is the "strategic" strand, which focuses on improving understanding of
underlying problems through the use of stories. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, Spirit-
Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 127,127-30 (1987).
Because this Article focuses on the message delivered to the general public about
Title VII and the problem it addresses, and scholarly journals would seem to have only an
indirect "trickle down" effect on education of the public, a detailed review of narrative
scholarship is beyond the scope of this Article. But see IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW
(1996) (urging an increase in scholarly attention to race consciousness as a primary means
of dismantling whiteness). For literature addressing the value of narrative scholarship
generally, see Jane Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Daniel A. Farber
& Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay On Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807 (1993); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991).
3 See DERMAN-SPARKS & PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 143-45, 152-54; A Workplace of
Difference Diversity Training Program (Anti-Defamation League/ A World of Difference
Inst., 1998) (on file with author).
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between groups is a complex, pervasive phenomenon maintained by
both institutional and individual forces.36 For example, a recently
published book that describes the experiences of two teachers in their
college course in anti-racism presents the phenomenon of racism as
having institutional, cultural, and individual components that interact
with and reinforce each other.3 7 The message of such educational efforts
is that inequality of opportunity between groups, including workplace
inequality, is a multi-layered problem.38 This problem defies any single
-6 As Michael Omi and Howard Winant state in their discussion of racism: "We believe...
that ideological beliefs have structural consequences, and that social structures give rise to
beliefs. Racial ideology and social structure, therefore, mutually shape the nature of racism
in a complex, dialectical, and overdetermined manner." MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1660s TO THE 1990s 74-75 (2d
ed. 1994). Omi And Winant also state:
Today, racial hegemony is 'messy.' The complexity of the present
situation is the product of a vast historical legacy of structural
inequality and invidious racial representation, which has been
confronted during the post-World War II period with an opposition
more serious and effective than any it had faced before.
Id. at 75-76.
Gunnar Myrdal labeled the same phenomenon a "vicious circle." GUNNAR
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 75 (1944). Myrdal cites historical developments in
housing, education, government, land ownership, health care, labor, the media and the arts
as continuing influences on both real inequality and perceived racial differences impacting
attitudes. Id. A more detailed discussion of the various components of structural or
institutional bias is beyond the scope of this Article. There have been recent attempts to
discuss the complexities of race in American society today. See, e.g., AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA REVISITED (Obie Clayton, Jr. ed., 1996); JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO
THE AMERICAN DREAM (1995).
37 See DERMAN-SPARKS & PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 10. In anti-racism education, many
educators attempt to boil down this complexity with a definition: "Racism equals. race
prejudice plus institutional power." Id. Unfortunately, such formulaic "boiling down"
may oversimplify the problem of inequality. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 36, at 69-71.
3 Adding even further to the complexity of the employment inequality problem is the
broad spectrum of "otherness" in this country. Even some of the most extensive studies of
the impact of race alone, including its manifestation in employment inequality, have
addressed race either exclusively or almost exclusively as a black/white issue. See, e.g.,
JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970); MYRDAL, supra note 36. The extent
to which the use of the black/white paradigm in discussing race adds or detracts from our
understanding of employment inequality more generally is an issue for debate; OMI &
WINANT, supra note 36; CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993); WHITE RACISM: ITS HISTORY,
PATHOLOGY AND PRACTICE (Barry N. Schwartz & Robert Disch eds., 1970). Compare Perea,
supra note 17, at 151-52 (arguing that biases associated with "foreignness" or with
"language or accent" experienced by Latino/as and Asian Americans cannot be
understood solely through study of black/white relations), and ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL
OPPRESSION IN AMERICA 175 (1972) (criticizing the black/white paradigm by pointing out
how the unique history of Mexican-Americans in the U.S. fits neither within the model of
assimilation applied to other non-black immigrant groups nor within the black/white
model), with John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi"'s "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay
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or short-term solution and closely parallels the message of those who.
were engaged in the struggle for equality before Title VII was enacted.39
Moreover, the presentation of this message through the perspective of
those who have been victims of inequality in different forms has
persuasive power reminiscent of the power of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
references to the experience of bias in his family.40 At the same time, bias
awareness education is about increasing understanding, not as an end,
but as a critical first step in actively working toward the aspiration of a
more level playing field.41
III. ARROGANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE ABOUT TITLE VII
The task of employing language to inspire people to work on the
problem of inequality generally without understating the severity of the
problem, although difficult, is clearly different from the task of
formulating and interpreting the law's response to just one aspect of that
problem-employment inequality. Government officials charged with the
latter task, however, choose the language they use to talk about the law.
Subsequently, the choices they make impact the law's message about the
problem the law seeks to address; a message with a substantial potential
impact on how the public perceives the problem. This Part explores how
the official language regarding Title VII has evolved and assesses the
changes in the message accompanying that evolution.
for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 61-62 (1997) (quoting JOE R.
FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHrrE RACISM xii (1995)) (suggesting that understanding the
pervasiveness of race in this country's institutional framework is a critical first step to
understanding discrimination against other groups). There is also other scholarship
discussing the black/white paradigm as an over simplistic picture of racism in America.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binanj, 75 TEX. L REV. 1181, 1185-95 (1997); Deborah
Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv.
957, 957-59 (1995); Robert S. Chang, Toward and Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post- Stncturalism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 1243, 1267 (1993).
"' Although I am not aware of any significant empirical data from which to assess the
impact of this training, the anecdotal evidence of the training's impact on bias
consciousness appears promising. In an anti-racism college course, white students, who at
the beginning of the course had verbally distanced themselves from problems associated
with race, began to identify their own unwanted attitudes about race, to understand the
pervasiveness of race as an institutional force and to see parallels between racism and other
institutional biases. See DERMAN-SPARKS & PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 4445, 107-18.
Meanwhile, students of color have developed a better understanding of how institutions
operate to affect the attitudes of others. See id. at 120-22.
40 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
41 DERMAN-SPARKS & PHILLIPS, suipra note 34, at 3; A Workplace of Difference Diversity
Training Program, supra note 35.
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A. Prologue to Arrogance: Official Rhetoric and the Enactment of Civil Rights
Legislation
In responding to the persuasive power of and pressure from
"outsider" voices in the Civil Rights Movement demanding change,42
"inside" political leaders attempted to persuade the broader public of the
need for change through the use of language often resembling the
rhetoric of civil rights leaders like Douglass, DuBois and King.43 For
example, following World War II, President Truman, having
investigated civil rights abuses, attempted to initiate a civil rights
program which included comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation. 44
In his address to Congress, Truman discussed "equal opportunity" as an
aspiration while emphasizing the contradiction between existing
inequality and constitutional ideals. 45 Similarly, on the heels of the civil
42 See PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLmCS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEw DEAL 72-94 (1985).
4- See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
44 GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 14-16. The sacrifice made by citizens of all backgrounds
during the war highlighted the contradictions and injustice of a state sanctioned second
class status at home. See Henry Steele Commager, Editorial Note, in THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY 42 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1967). These contradictions became a
catalyst for increased African-American pressure on the government for legislative action.
See id.; see also Vincent Harding. We the People: The Long Journey Toward A More Perfect
Union, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990, at 1, 29-32
(Claybome Carson et al. eds., 1991) (pointing out that, in response to the contradictory
messages sent by the government in calling for African-Americans to join in the war effort
against Hitler's racism while sanctioning segregation in America, black newspapers
protested and threatened a march on Washington unless a Presidential order was made
ending discrimination in the defense industry).
45 President Harry S. Truman, Civil Rights Message to Congress (1948), in THE STRUGGLE FOR
RACIAL EQUALITY 45-46 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1967). After some introduction of the
founding ideals of the nation, Truman's speech provided:
We shall not, however, finally achieve the ideals for which this Nation
was founded so long as any American suffers discrimination as a
result of his race, or religion, or color, or the land of origin of his
forefathers.
Unfortunately there still are examples-flagrant examples-of
discrimination which are utterly contrary to our ideals. Not all groups
of our population are free from the fear of violence. Not all groups are
free to live and work where they please or to improve their conditions
of life by their own efforts. Not all groups enjoy the full privileges of
citizenship and participation in the Govenmerit under which they
live.
We cannot be satisfied until all our people have equal opportunities for
jobs, for homes, for education, for health, and for political expression,
and until all our people have equal protection under the law ....
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rights demonstrations in Birmingham, President Kennedy delivered a
nationally televised speech in which he emphasized the contradiction
between the national ideal of equality and the oppression experienced by
so many because of their color.46  The two speeches differed
substantially, however, in how they depicted the complexity of racial
inequality and the corresponding difficulty of addressing the problem in
the law.
With respect to the role of civil rights legislation in addressing racial
inequality, Truman stated as follows:
If we wish to inspire. the peoples of the world whose
freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to
those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we
wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct
the remaining imperfections in our practice of
democracy. We know the ways. We need only the
will. 47
Truman's characterization of the inequality of opportunity which he
had previously described in his speech as "the remaining imperfection"
of the American system, and his statement that the means of correcting
the problem were "known" certainly conveyed the impression that the
appropriate legislation would solve the problem.
In sharp contrast, Kennedy's expression of aspiration in equal
opportunity depicted a more distant and elusive goal; one which would
be reached only through moral transformation as well as legislation:
This is not even a legal or legislative issue alone. It is
better to settle these matters in the courts than on the
streets, and new laws are needed at every level. But law
alone cannot make men see right. We are confronted
primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the
Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to
be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities;
46 See President John F. Kennedy, Nationally Televised Speech (1963), in THE EYES ON THE
PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE
BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990, at 160, 160-62 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991).
47 See Truman, supra note 45, at 48.
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whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as
we want to be treated.48
By stating that the law, regardless of its content, would not be a
panacea for inequality of opportunity, Kennedy challenged individuals
to look for inequality in their lives and to consider their own role in
working toward a more just society. As the process of enacting civil
rights legislation began, this contrast between the message that
legislation was a needed, but necessarily insufficient, step for addressing
inequality of opportunity and the message that legislation was the
solution to the problem reappeared in the public rhetoric.
When the bill that was eventually enacted as the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was introduced, Attorney General Robert Kennedy's remarks
included a message consistent with the more cautious message
previously communicated by his brother: "With respect to the bill [H.R.
7152] in its entirety, it must be emphasized that racial discrimination has
been with us since long before the United States became a nation, and we
cannot expect it to vanish through the enactment of laws alone."49
President Johnson's comments regarding equality of opportunity when
he signed the bill into law, however, were more reminiscent of Truman's
message in portraying the law as solution to the problem rather than as a
step toward a distant goal. s° Johnson also sent the following direct
message to the nation's citizens:
This Civil Rights Act is a challenge to all of us to go to
work in our communities and our states, in our homes
41 See Kennedy, supra note 46, at 161.
49 CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 5 (1985).
51 Johnson's remarks at 6:45 p.m. EST on July 2, 1964 were in pertinent part as follows:
I am about to sign into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 want to take
this occasion to talk to you about what the law means to every
American .... We believe that all men are created equal, yet many are
denied equal treatment. We believe that all men have certain
unalienable rights yet many Americans do not enjoy those rights. We
believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of liberty, yet millions
are being deprived of those blessings, not because of their own failures
but because of the color of their skin .... But it cannot continue. Our
Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. The principles
of our freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign
tonight forbids it.
Johnson's Address on Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1964, at 9 [hereinafter Johnson's
Address]. See also WHALEN, supra note 49, at 227.
Beery: From Aspiration to Arrogance and Back: The Once and Future Role o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2000
452 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
and in our hearts to eliminate the last vestiges of injustice
in our beloved country .... I urge every American to
join in this effort to bring justice and hope to all our
people and to bring peace to our land.51
Like President Kennedy, Johnson appealed to the country's citizens
to take responsibility for working to end discrimination; but, by linking
the effort urged to the legislation itself, he implied that cooperation and
compliance with the legislation might suffice to resolve the problem.5 2
Moreover, his reference to "the last vestiges of injustice," like Truman's
reference to "the remaining imperfections,"5 3 seemed to grossly
underestimate the pervasiveness of inequality of opportunity between
groups and the corresponding difficulty of addressing that inequality.
Within the ambitious message of what the law would accomplish were
the seeds of an arrogance affirming message that compliance with the
law would produce equality of opportunity.5 4
B. The EEOC's Message of Arrogance: "Equal Employment Opportunity" is
the Law
With the enactment of Title VII, "equal employment opportunity"
became a part of the language of formal law itself, and control of the
message to the regulated public about the meaning of equal employment
opportunity was left in the hands of the agencies and courts which
51 See Johnson's Address, supra note 50, at 9.
52 Johnson delivered a very different message a year later in conjunction with the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of
centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, do as you
desire, choose the leaders you please.
You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then
say, "You are free to compete with all the others," and still justly
believe you have been completely fair.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Howard Commencement Address: Equality as a Fact and as a
Result (1965), quoted in HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 174 (1990)
5-1 See Truman, supra note 45, at 48.
54 William McCulloch, the senior Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, who
played an important role in pushing the bill through, expressed concern about sending an
overly ambitious message about the efficacy of the statute: "To create hope of immediate.
and complete success can only promote conflict and result in brooding despair." WHALEN,
supra note 49, at 229.
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would interpret the language of the statute thereafter.55  Alfred
Blumrosen, the first Chief of Conciliations for the EEOC, has described
the history of Title VII and its interpretation as an illustration of the "law
transmission system," defined as "the process by which legal policy is
translated into 'real world' changes in socio-economic behavior."5 6
According to Blumrosen, the EEOC shaped the initial interpretation of
what Title VII prohibited.5 7
Title VII requires aggrieved parties to file a complaint with the EEOC
as the first step in seeking relief for alleged workplace discrimination.5
Once a complaint is filed, the EEOC must investigate the complaint and,
based on that investigation, make an initial determination of whether
"reasonable cause" exists to believe that the statute has been violated.5 9
Because making this determination at first necessarily required the
agency to interpret Title VII without the benefit of court precedent,
reasonable cause determinations were the principal means through
which the agency communicated the interpretation of the statute to both
the courts and the regulated community. 60  The EEOC also
5 The statute's actual use of the phrase, however, was limited to its incorporation in the
name of the agency created to administer the statute, the EEOC. The name of the EEOC
arose in the House Education and Labor Committee chaired by James Roosevelt, son of the
late President, who later became the first Chairman of the EEOC. See id. at 22. The phrase
"equal employment opportunity" probably first appeared as a matter of formal law in the
name of the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity set up by President John F.
Kennedy in 1961 in conjunction with his executive order prohibiting discrimination in
government employment. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961). Upon signing
the order, President Kennedy said: "I have dedicated my administration to the cause of
equal opportunity in employment by the government or its contractors." GRAHAM, supra
note 7, at 40 (quoting Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Establishing the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, PUB. PAPERS (Mar. 7, 1961)).
Before Kennedy, the phrase "fair employment practices" referred to both national and state
antidiscrimination efforts. Id. at 10-23.
56 ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 3 (1993) [hereinafter BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW].
57 The initial interpretation of the legislation is the third of Blumrosen's eight stages of law
transmission. Id. at 10-11. The first two stages are "social impulse" and "legislative
consideration," respectively. Id. at 10. The best example of the EEOC's use of the
reasonable cause determination and the issuance of guidelines together to push effectively
for a broad interpretation of discrimination occurred in the agency's handling of the issue
of employment testing, a practice which had become a major barrier to the improvement of
minority employment opportunity. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: "Griggs
v. Duke Power Co." and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59,59-61
(1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1994).
s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
60 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAw, supra note 56, at 70.
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communicated its initial interpretation of what Title VII prohibited
through administrative guidelines. 61
During the years before the Supreme Court heard its first Title VII
case, the EEOC made a conscious policy choice to interpret Title VII
broadly "so as to maximize its impact on employer practices." 62 Of
course, the most critical issue was interpreting discrimination, the
prohibited conduct. Although it appeared that the legislature had
focused on intentional adverse treatment of outgroup members in
prohibiting discrimination, 63 the agency perceived that limiting
discrimination to intentional conduct would inhibit the law's capacity to
cause employers to address the broader range of corduct that restricted
outgroup employment opportunity.64 In order to encourage employers
to modify or eliminate practices with such restrictive "effects," the
agency's administrators worked for an interpretation of Title VII that
would prohibit at least some of those practices that would be provable
without evidence of an intent to discriminate.65 The agency believed that
such a broad administrative interpretation provided the best hope for the
legislation to be a catalyst for progress toward equal employment
opportunity.6 6
The EEOC's policy decision to interpret Title VII broadly was
vindicated when the Supreme Court, in its first Title VII decision,
recognized that the conduct prohibited by the statute included practices
with discriminatory effects on outgroup members, and not just decisions
61 See id. at 74.
62 Id. at 67.
63 Graham and Blumrosen disagree on what the legislative history indicates about the
scope of conduct which the legislature intended to prohibit in Title VII. Graham asserts that
the compromise reached in the legislature indicated an intent to prohibit only conduct
motivated by conscious prejudice, in part because "the concept of invidious discrimination
had always been premised upon the intent to do harm to the individual." GRAHAM, supra
note 7, at 20. Blumrosen, on the other hand, asserts that there really was no debate on the
meaning of discrimination and thus that the legislature left it to the courts and the
administrative process to decide that meaning. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, su~pra note 56,
at 50. Blumrosen nevertheless acknowledges that the legislators were primarily focused on
discrimination as the intentional adverse treatment of outgroup members. Id. at 73. "The
legislators, to the extent that they thought about discrimination, emphasized the deliberate
restriction of opportunities of blacks which had characterized the South." Id.
64 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 72-75. In particular, the EEOC was
concerned that industry would never respond constructively to accusations of moral
wrongdoing in conjunction with discrimination. See id. at 73.
6 See id. See also infra notes 133-45 (discussing the intent requirement).
66 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 75.
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overtly based on outgroup membership. 67 In reaching its unanimous
decision, the Court relied heavily on the EEOC's interpretation of the
statute as communicated through administrative guidelines.68 The
EEOC's Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures and Employee
Selection Procedures, to which the Court referred specifically, required
that employers demonstrate the job-relatedness of procedures used to
select and place employees.69 Through these types of guidelines and the
reasonable cause determinations applying them, the EEOC effectively
communicated and obtained a broad construction of discrimination
without the use of language suggesting that Title VII would solve the
problem of employment inequality.70  Instead, the EEOC, in the
Guidelines, employed language limited to describing specific steps for
employers to follow for testing or any other kind of process used to
select or place employees 71 The message from the agency was merely
that practices which were not overtly exclusionary might nevertheless
unjustifiably obstruct employment for outgroup members. The agency's
language neither limited the law's coverage to such practices, nor
portrayed the law as a comprehensive provider of equal employment
opportunity. Eventually, however, the agency became involved in more
sweeping statements to the regulated community about the law and its
aspiration.
The EEOC's role in assisting employers with their efforts to comply
with Title VII soon placed it at the forefront of the debate over
affirmative action. In response to both agency activities and the initial
interpretation of Title VII by the courts, public and private employers
alike changed many of their employment practices.72 Some initiated
67 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); see also infra notes 99-110 and
accompanying text (discussing the Griggs decision).
6 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 ("Since the Act and its legislative history support the
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing
the will of Congress.").
6 See id. at 433 n.9 (quoting Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607,35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970)).
7 See id. The Court cited the EEOC's application of the testing guidelines in CCH Empl.
Prac. Guide 17,304.53 (EEOC Dec. 2, 1966). See id. at 430 n.6. This EEOC decision itself
merely explains the application of the guidelines to the specific facts of the case. See
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 108.
71 See supra note 69.
7 By the mid-70s, employers in major industries like telecommunications and steel were
"moving toward policies of inclusion of minorities and women, which [they] would not
have considered a decade earlier." See BLUMROSEN, supra note 56, at 218. Moreover,
statistics indicate that minorities were moving into more desirable positions from labor and
service positions at a higher rate in 1970 than they had in 1960. Id. at 292.
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voluntary affirmative action type programs which were subject to
challenge as reverse discrimination. After the Supreme Court confirmed
the possibility of reverse discrimination in affirmative action under Title
VI,7 key employees at the EEOC realized the need to provide some kind
of safe harbor as guidance for private employers attempting to fully
comply with the spirit of Title VII through voluntary affirmative
measures. 74 Here, the agency's task was particularly challenging because
of the tension between the law's prohibition of discrimination and the
nature of affirmative action as decision-making based on protected class
status.
After considerable deliberation and the receipt of public comments,
the EEOC adopted Guidelines on Affirmative Action as a means of
protecting voluntary affirmative efforts of employers.75 The EEOC built
its support for voluntary affirmative action on an aggressive articulation
of Title VII's purpose: "Congress enacted Title VII in order to improve
the economic and social conditions of minorities and women by providing
equality of opportunity in the work place." 76 The agency employed the
rhetoric of equating the aspiration and the law in order to facilitate a
broad reading of the statute; and, if judged by the opinion of the
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,77 the first Title
VH reverse discrimination case, the approach succeeded.78
While the rhetoric may have accomplished its short term persuasive
purpose, however, describing Title VII as "the provider" of equal
employment opportunity may have been, in hindsight, a less than
optimal use of language. By portraying equal opportunity as the
product of Title VII, the EEOC appeared to send a message about equal
opportunity quite different from the less arrogant depiction of a distant
aspiration connected to a complicated legacy of inequality. The nature of
71 See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
74 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAw, supra note 56, at 238.
7 Id. at 242.
76 Id. at 243 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (emphasis added)). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Coordinating Council, established by Congress in 1972 to facilitate
coordination between all federal and state agencies in this arena, employed similar rhetoric
in its policy statement on affirmative action, including the following: "Equal employment
opportunity is the law of the land." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.17(1) (1999).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
78 In Weber, the Court upheld the employer's plan to increase the percentage of African-
Americans in its skilled workforce through the use of percentage-based hiring. Id. at 208-
09. The Justice Department's brief in the case quoted the EEOC's guidelines in their
entirety. See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 246.
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the affirmative action guidelines indicates that the limited segment of the
workforce that is exposed to them is probably unaffected by the subtle
distinction therein between equal employment opportunity (EEO) as
aspiration and EEO as legal result,79 but the shift in language and
message represents a troubling development.
Regardless of the impact of the EEOC's guidelines on affirmative
action, virtually all employees have received the message: "EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IS THE LAW." 8° These words are
located in large bold type at the top of the poster which all employers
engaged in interstate commerce must place in a prominent location.8 '
Thus, the rhetoric is likely to reach not only employees who actually read
the poster but also those who merely pass it in the hallway. This simple
phrase clearly conveys the message that the law is the solution to
employment inequality. For those who choose to review the fine print in
the poster, three columns of more specific information cover (from left to
right) federal contractors, all private and public employers, and
programs receiving federal financial assistance, respectively. 82 The
language under the heading for Executive Order 11,24683 states that the
order "requires affirmative action to ensure equality of opportunity in all
aspects of employment." 84 The message of both statements affirms
arrogance because it suggests that compliance with the law takes care of
employer responsibility for employment inequality.
79 Even employees responsible for their employers' compliance with Title VII would not
necessarily be familiar with the affirmative action guidelines. Moreover, the substantive
"message" of the guidelines as a safe harbor for voluntary affirmative efforts is not affected
by the distinction between EEO as aspiration and EEO as solution. As a result, it is
questionable whether those who read the guidelines actually pick up this distinction.
O Consolidated EEO Poster, 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 441:153 (Fair Empl. Prac. Manual
1997).
Si Although Title VII only covers employers with fifteen or more workers, the Equal Pay
Act, which has no numerical coverage restriction, also requires covered employers to put
up the Consolidated EEO Poster. See id. at 441:151; Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a), (d) (1994).
82 Consolidated EEO Poster, supra note 80.
83 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
I Consolidated EEO poster, supra note 80. Apparently, according to the poster, equal
employment opportunity (and therefore the law) requires affirmative measures by
government contractors that are not required for other employers, who are merely subject
to an obligation not to discriminate. Id. This distinction between federal contractors and
other employers is clearly contrary to the EEOC's stated policy that affirmative action is
needed in both private and public employment to reach the goal of equal employment
opportunity. See Guidelines on Affirmative Action, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1999).
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The emergence of EEO as a common term in the workplace has
further aided this portrayal of compliance as the producer of equal
employment opportunity. After broadly defining what Title VII
required in its formal guidance to employers, the EEOC pursued a
strategy of using more specific guidelines and the conciliation process to
induce employers to utilize their own internal mechanisms to. improve
the workplace opportunities of minorities and women.85 One result of
these very positive measures 86 was the development of corporate EEO
programs with EEO officers responsible for disseminating EEO policies
to employees.87 Kimberl Williams Crenshaw has described how this
development contributes to complacency about the problem of
employment inequality:
Company X can be an equal opportunity employer even
though Company X has no Blacks or any other
minorities in its employ. Practically speaking, all
companies can now be equal opportunity employers by
proclamation alone. Society has embraced the rhetoric
of equal opportunity without fulfilling its promise;
creating a break with the past has formed the basis for
the neoconservative claim that present inequities cannot
be the result of discriminatory practices because this
society no longer discriminates ....
Thus, aided by the spread of EEO as familiar rhetoric in the
American workplace, the message that EEO is the law has reached a
broad spectrum of the American public. Meanwhile, the message that
equal employment opportunity is actually a very distant aspiration
toward which the law is directed, and the potential of that message to
both educate and inspire action have been lost.
85 See BLUMROSEN, supra note 56, at 90.
86 Increased employer focus on EEO clearly produced some positive changes in employer
behavior. See id. at 89-92.
87 See id. at 91-92. Also contributing to the corporate EEO phenomenon was enforcement
by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") of Executive Order
11,246, which required federal contractors to take affirmative action to "ensure"
nondiscrimination in their respective workplaces. 3 C.F.R. § 340 (1965). For example, the
OFCCP required government contractors to identify a particular manager responsible for
organizing and running the contractor's "equal employment program." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.22
(1965).
88 Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (1988).
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IV. TITLE VII DOCTRINE: THE LAW'S INCOMPLETE RESPONSE
TO EMPLOYMENT INEQUALITY
Language that portrays the law as the solution to the complex
problem of employment inequality plainly misrepresents what the law
does under Supreme Court doctrine interpreting Title VII. Contrary to
what the EEOC's poster says, the Title VII doctrine does not fully
respond to employment inequality. Thus, "equal employment
opportunity" or the ideal of the level workplace playing field is not the
law, 89 and the EEOC's message to the contrary appears both arrogant
and plainly inaccurate today.
The inconsistency between the Title VII doctrine and the EEOC's
message about the law is demonstrated in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of discrimination the conduct prohibited by the statute.
Although the concept of discrimination under Title VII remains
somewhat murky, 90 the courts clearly recognize two "types" or theories
of discrimination: disparate treatment and adverse or disparate impact.91
Under the disparate treatment theory, an employer's conduct constitutes
discrimination when it involves adverse treatment of an individual or
group of individuals on the basis of their membership in a protected
class.92 In other words, discriminatory intention renders the employer's
89 Cf. MYRDAL, supra note 36, at 209 (discussing "equality of opportunity" as one aspect of
the set of ideals comprising "the American Creed").
90 See George Ruthergien, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 117-18
(1995) (arguing that the concept of discrimination is undefined or at least incompletely
defined by the law).
9 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Ronald Turner, Thirh Years of Title Vii's Regnlaton Regime:
Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375 (1995) (tracing the history of Title VII
analysis). The most comprehensive treatise on employment discrimination law divides
employment discrimination into four categories: "(1) disparate treatment; (2) policies or
practices that perpetuate in the present the effects of past discrimination; (3) policies or
practices, not justified by business necessity, causing an adverse impact on a protected
group; and (4) failure to make 'reasonable accommodation' ... to the religious observations
or practices of an employee or applicant." 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 4 (3d ed. 1996). The second of these categories
specifically relates to whether a particular practice qualifies as a bona fide seniority system
under Section 703(h) of Title VII. Id. at 51-77. Although this issue triggers a distinct
analysis under the doctrine, it does not represent a theory on the wrong of discrimination
truly distinct from adverse impact. Under Title VII, the fourth category applies only to
religion, and although "reasonable accommodation" is an explicit theory under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994) (incorporating amendments of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
92 See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 91, at 9.
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conduct in violation of Title VII.93 Under the adverse impact theory,
even if the employer's practice is not based on discriminatory intent, the
practice is prohibited, if it has a disproportionate impact on a protected
group, unless the employer can justify the practice as a business need.94
Thus, adverse impact focuses on the inequitable results flowing from
ostensibly neutral or even well-intentioned practices.
Under this two theory structure, two aspects of the Title VII doctrine
working together demonstrate the incompleteness of the doctrine as a
description of and response to employment inequality. First, the
language that describes the problem which adverse impact analysis
addresses fails to connect adverse impact to disparate, treatment as two
different manifestations or ways of proving employment inequality.
Instead, the language suggests that the two theories represent the two
distinct "types" of conduct prohibited by the statute. 95 By failing to
describe in language how disparate treatment and adverse impact are
merely different ways of determining the same thing-that employer
decision making is contributing to inequality in the workplace-the
doctrine fails to recognize the possibility that the two different analyses
may not cover the full range of decision making behavior causing
inequality in the workplace. As a result, aspects of employer decision
making, which are part of employment inequality but are not covered by
one of the two theories, can slip through the doctrine not only
unaddressed by law but unrecognized as part of the problem.
The second aspect of the doctrine addressed herein follows the first
as an example of how the incompleteness of the two theories can allow
components of employment inequality to slip through the doctrine
quietly. Specifically, disparate treatment analysis, which focuses on
specific personnel decisions (rather than the general policies and
procedures that adverse impact analysis targets), fails to account for the
influence of unconscious bias in those types of decisions. As a result, the
doctrine sends a message to the public about discrimination which is
incomplete as a description of the larger and more complex problem of
employment inequality. This incompleteness of the law's response to
employment inequality demonstrates the inappropriateness of the
EEOC's message about the law and contributes further to that message's
9- See infra notes 133-38 for discussion of whether motivation and intent are
distinguishable concepts.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a) (1994); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
0 See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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affirmance of a "complacency with compliance" attitude among the
regulated public.
A. The Lack of an Articulated Link Between Theories of Discrimination
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9
was unanimous, not all of the legal community viewed the interpretation
of Title VII to include as prohibited conduct "neutral" practices with
discriminatory effects as a sound interpretation of Title VII. 97 The
decision was a major victory for civil rights advocates9s and the EEOC,
whose employee selection guidelines were heavily relied on by the
Court.99 The guidelines required that selection procedures for jobs be
validly related to requirements for performing those jobs.1 °  The
intuitive good sense of the guidelines combined in Griggs with a set of
facts which indicated how an employer might establish "facially neutral"
requirements and accomplish the kind of exclusionary results previously
obtained through overt exclusion. Specifically, the employer's
requirement of high school education and satisfactory performance on
two aptitude tests had the same effect on the employment status of black
employees as its previous overt selection process, pursuant to which the
employer openly limited consideration of black applicants to the least
skilled positions.101 Thus, "easy facts" helped to make "good law." 102
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7 For analysis of the development of adverse impact analysis from Griggs to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, see Turner, supra note 91, at 444-56. As Turner points out in his
analysis, the recognition of adverse impact analysis was controversial in part because it
was so difficult to reconcile with the statutory language. Turner, suipra note 91, at 449-51.
See also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("[Dlisparate impact theory-[has] no
real basis as far as statutory language goes."). The decision also did not appear to be
supported by the legislative history of Title VII. See supra note 49-51; see also Hugh Steven
Wilson, A Second Look at "Griggs v. Duke Power Company": Ruminations on Job Testing,
Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L REv. 844, 852-58 (1972) (asserting
and supporting the proposition that the legislative history is inconsistent with the
interpretation of a job relatedness requirement for employment tests).
9 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. wrote the brief and argued the case for Griggs,
advocating for an interpretation consistent with the Court's opinion. See BLUMROSEN,
MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 99 n.10.
9 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4(0 U.S. 424 (1971). Notably absent from the decision
was any citation either to the statute or its legislative history. See id.
100 Id. at 432.
1o1 See id. at 427-28, 430. The district court found that the employer in Griggs had overtly
discriminated against blacks in hiring and job assignment before Title VII's effective date.
See id. at 426-27.
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While Griggs represented life for a broader interpretation of the
concept of discrimination than might otherwise have survived,103 the
decision became the foundation for a doctrinal dichotomy with some
negative implications for the message of the law. Although the opinion
did not explicitly discuss adverse impact as a type of discrimination to be
distinguished from disparate treatment,104 the Court implied that it was
recognizing a basis for liability under Title VII as an alternative to, rather
than inclusive of discriminatory intent.0  The language in cases
interpreting Griggs has tended to distinguish more explicitly the target of
the Griggs analysis from disparate treatment analysis, rather than to
describe it in relation to disparate treatment as part of an overall concept
of discrimination.1 6 Because of this linguistic line drawing, a categorical
'°0 This is, of course, the flip side of the maxim, "hard facts make bad law," which
originated in Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. U.S.,
193 U.S. 197 (1904). See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions,
71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 235 n.66 (1997). What Holmes actually wrote was that "[gireat
cases, like hard cases, make bad law." Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 364.
10 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 100, 122; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
1"4 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. Justice Burger's opinion included no discussion of disparate
treatment. The opinion merely recognized that "(Title VIII proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." See
Id. at 432.
1o Id. ("Congress directed the thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
' In lntenational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, the Court set forth an explanation of the
two theories which provided in pertinent part as follows:
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory.
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This explanation
thereafter became and continues to be the definitive description cited for what constitutes
discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Hazen Piper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609
(1993); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 n.10 (1987), Anderson v. Zubieta,
180 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir.
1999). But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, in which the Court attempted to discuss
the two theories as different manifestations of the single wrong of conduct which produces
an adverse effect linked to a protected characteristic. 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988).
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division has emerged between "mutually exclusive" theories of
discrimination under Title VII.107
The analyses that correspond to the two types of discrimination
address a common wrong, but the doctrine never articulates that wrong
as a unified concept and, therefore, misses the opportunity to promote a
better understanding of the wrong. Under adverse impact analysis, once
the plaintiff has identified a particular practice and demonstrated its
discriminatory effect on individuals of a protected class, the employer
must prove the "job relatedness" of the practice.tm Under disparate
treatment analysis, once the plaintiff presents the prima facie case at least
theoretically creating an inference of discriminatory intent,10 9 the
employer must articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
the challenged decision.10
Although the language and the evidentiary burdens differ,"' both
analyses inquire into whether an employment decision unjustifiably
contributes to inequality in the workplace. Yet the doctrine never really
communicates this common problem or wrong as part of an overall
description of discrimination. Instead, the doctrine communicates that
one type of employment decision may be wrong because of its effects,
while the other, as discussed in the next section, is wrong because of the
107 See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 27
(3d ed. Supp. 1998) ("Although the plaintiff can, and frequently will, combine disparate
treatment and adverse impact claims as alternative theories of liability, the two are
mutually exclusive; the former theory applies to intentional discrimination, the latter to
attacks on rules 'fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.'") (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431).
'OR See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). This case's holding was
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994), which requires the employer to prove that
a practice with adverse impact is "job related for the position in question, and consistent
with business necessity." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
109 See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2236-37 (1995) ("[TJhe Supreme Court never succeeded in setting the prima facie
case threshold high enough to permit the proven prima fade case to support a sufficiently
strong inference of discrimination to mandate judgment for the plaintiff when combined
only with disbelief of the employer's stated justification."). The requirements for the
plaintiff's prima facie case are probably not sufficient to create an inference of
discriminatory intent. Id; William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathnwater, and Throwing Out Proof
Stnctures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT
POL'Y J. 361, 370 (1998) (agreeing on this point).
110 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
M See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 91, at 17-22 (stating that the employer's
disparate treatment burden is merely one of production). In contrast, the employer's
burden in adverse impact cases to show "business necessity" is a burden of proof in the
nature of an affirmative defense. See id. at 106-10.
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decision maker's intent. Thus, although Griggs represented much
needed recognition of some of the complexity of employment inequality
as a matter of substance, its language started a doctrinal division which
paradoxically prevents the doctrine from improving public
understanding of employment inequality over time.
Given the division of discrimination into two types subject to
different analyses, the doctrine necessarily will not address or recognize
any aspects of the problem of employment inequality which the two
analyses do not cover. To the extent any such aspects exist, Title VII is
not the solution to the problem of employment inequality, and equal
employment opportunity cannot be the law.
B. Disparate Treatment, Unconscious Bias and Doctrinal Incompleteness
Disparate treatment analysis uniquely applies to claims of
discrimination aimed at specific personnel decisions that do not involve
the use of any general policy or procedure with a disproportionate
adverse impact on a protected group.112 For example, individual
termination decisions, most of which focus on the conduct or
performance of the discharged employee, are not usually subject to
challenge under adverse impact theory." 3 As discussed hereafter, the
Supreme Court's focus on intent in describing disparate treatment
analysis fails to recognize the ways in which unconscious bias in specific
personnel decisions, like individual terminations, contributes to
employment inequality. The doctrine's incompleteness in this area
establishes the inappropriateness of the message that Title VII is the
solution to employment inequality. Moreover, the doctrinal focus on
intent and the courts' use of other language vilifying the disparate
treatment discriminator tend to affirm complacency in the regulated
community by suggesting that only bad people engage in disparate
treatment discrimination.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,114 the Supreme Court
introduced the proof scheme for disparate treatment claims based on
112 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
113 See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 91, at 857-59. Terminations that involve the
use of particular selection criteria (as in many layoffs) or the violation of a particular policy
or rule of the employer could be subject to challenge under adverse impact theory, but
these types of challenges are rare in the individual termination decision context. Id. at 858-
59.
114 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
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circumstantial evidence.115 In describing the plaintiff's ultimate burden
of proof, the Court, although it did not actually use any form of the word
"intent," implied that the wrong to be demonstrated was the employer's
intent to discriminate.116 Since that seminal decision, the Court and
lower courts interpreting McDonnell Douglass consistently have used
"intentional" 117 or "purposeful" 118 to describe the wrong targeted by
disparate treatment. Within the law, "intent" is a slippery concept which
defies a single precise definition, but regardless of the legal context in
which it is used, "intent" generally refers to a level of conscious desire or
will.119  Similarly, "purposeful" carries the message that the
discriminator must mean to discriminate. 20 Thus, to the extent the
decisions describe what the employment discrimination plaintiff must
prove as "intentional" or "purposeful" discrimination, the decisions
send the message that what decision makers must avoid is consciously
115 See id. at 802. Under the proof scheme, in the usual case where a plaintiff does not have
available "direct evidence" (evidence which will prove the discriminatory intent behind a
challenged employment decision without the need for inference, such as comments by the
decision maker that a protected characteristic motivated the decision), a plaintiff must first
set out a prima facie case. Id. Although the nature of the prima facie case varies somewhat
depending on the nature of the decision challenged, it generally consists of presenting
evidence that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question, that an adverse action
was taken against the plaintiff with respect to that position, and that the employer filled the
position with someone else. Id. Once the plaintiff has crossed this minimal hurdle, the
burden rests on the employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
decision. Id. at 802. The plaintiff then must carry the ultimate burden of proving that the.
protected characteristic motivated the decision. Id. at 804-05.
116 See id. at 802-05 (stating that the plaintiffs ultimate burden was to show that the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons "were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision"). Clearly, proving a "coverup" for a discriminatory decision
requires proof of intent to discriminate. Id.
117 See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."); St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-17 (1993) (stating that the plaintiff's proof of
pretext may or may not satisfy the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination).
118 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977) ("The
Government's theory of discrimination was simply that the company, in violation of §
703(a) of Title VII, regularly and purposefully treated Negroes and Spanish-surnamed
Americans less favorably than white persons.").
119 Black's Law Dictionary defines intent generally as "[t]he state of mind accompanying an
act, esp. a forbidden act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (pocket ed. 1996). Intention is
similarly defined to refer to a conscious mental phenomenon: "The willingness to bring
about something that one plans or foresees; the state of being set to do something." Id.
120 If anything, "purposeful" is even more clearly exclusive of unconscious motivation than
intent. The use of both terms together conveys the message that the sense of intent
intended is "specific intent," or "[tihe intent to accomplish the precise act with which one
has been charged .. " Id.
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basing adverse treatment of employees on one of the protected
characteristics.' 2
The focus of the disparate treatment doctrine on conscious bias in the
context of specific personnel decisions (which are not covered under
adverse impact doctrine) provides a very clear example of the doctrine's
incompleteness as a response to the problem of employment
inequality. 22 Given that employment decision making involves the
exercise of brain function, it is not surprising that studies in psychology
have made an important contribution to the study of employment
inequality in the law. Numerous law review articles discussing the role
of prejudice in the law have cited Gordon Alport's now classic
exhaustive study,'23 which defines prejudice as the belief in the
inferiority of those who belong to outgroups.124  Allport explains
prejudice as having a variety of psychological antecedents including:
personality, 125 thinking aspects of brain function, commonly referred to
as cognition, 126 and emotional aspects of brain function, commonly
referred to as affect.' 27 Since Allport, psychologists have continued to
study discrimination extensively, and their work speaks volumes about
121 The view of discrimination as consciously biased decision making also may have been
consistent with the most commonly understood meaning of discrimination at the time the
statute was enacted. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 7.
122 Numerous scholars have criticized the intent-based paradigm for disparate treatment.
See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 87; Alan Freeman, Antidiscrinination Law: The View from 1989,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 121-50 (David Kairys ed., 1998); Patricia Williams, supra note 34, at
129; D. Marvin Jones, The Death of the Employer: inage, Text and Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REV.
349 (1992).
123 GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 6-9 (1954). See, e.g., Juan F. Perea,
Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 805,834-35 (1994); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 907 (1993) (focusing specifically on the Title VII doctrine). For
articles that address the role of prejudice in other doctrinal areas, see for example, Jody
Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83
CAL. L. REV. 733, 742, 765-66 (1995) (exploring possible means of reducing the extent to
which jurors are influenced by bias); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 333, 337 (1987)
(applying Freudian and cognitive psychology to support modification of equal protection
analysis under the Constitution).
124 ALLPORT, supra note 123, at 6-9.
'2 Id. at 395-441 (discussing the relationship between character structure and prejudice).
126 See id. at 165-218 (discussing the role of perception and thinking).
127 See id. at 343-92 (discussing the role of emotions). Prejudice is also described as an
attitudinal link to the behavioral problem of discrimination, defined as the detrimental
treatment of members of "outgroups." Id. at 14-15.
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the difficulty of getting to the roots of how characteristics like race
influence decision making.128
Linda Hamilton Krieger provided an excellent, well-researched, and
thorough discussion of what cognitive psychological studies of how
human brains confront, interpret and remember information indicate
about the nature of the type of decision making called discrimination. 129
Krieger explains that at a very early age, human beings develop
psychological categories which become filters through which all
subsequent information is processed and remembered.130 Stereotypes
under this theory are particular categories which give rise to
expectancies affecting the perception of new information. 131 These
categories, which are developed and enhanced over time, operate largely
at an unconscious level. 132 Thus, to the extent categories operate to bias
decision making, the employer may make a decision which unjustifiably
results in adverse treatment of outgroup members without any
awareness of the underlying bias which causes the adverse decision. 33
128 See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 121
(1994); AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE PROCESSES IN GROUP
PERCEPTION (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993); PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); Eleanor
Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNmON AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 27-48 (Eleanor
Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978).
129 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employnent Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. RE'.. 1161 (1995).
1' Id. at 1190.
131 See id. at 1198. See also David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping:
Au Overview of the Cognitive'Approach, ill PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 127, 127-
58 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (asserting that the categorization of
information causes stereotypes or expectancies that influence how we interpret, process,
and remember information and that, without such categorization, our cognitive processes
would be overloaded by the overwhelming amount of information about each individual
we see).
132 See Krieger, supra note 129, at 1214-15 and authorities cited therein.
'13 The body of research supporting the impact of cognitive categorization on intergroup
perception and judgment is substantial and has grown since the publication of Krieger's
article. For a comprehensive summary of this body of research, see Susan T. Fiske,
Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357-
411 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). According to Fiske, studies have
consistently supported the theory that the unconscious development of categories of
people, which is part of normal cognitive functioning, alters the way people process
information about others, impacting how new events are interpreted and how causation of
those events is understood. Id. at 364-71. Moreover, people tend to remember information
which is consistent with categorical expectancies more than information which tends to
conflict with those expectancies; thus, categories once formed are somewhat resistant to
change over time. Id. at 371-72.
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As Krieger concludes, the doctrinal focus on intent fails to account for
the impact these unconscious processes have on inequality in the
workplace1 34
While principally articulating the target of disparate treatment
discrimination through the concept of "intent," the Supreme Court has
also used "motive" or "motivation" concurrently with "intent."135
Unlike "intent," which is generally defined to include a conscious
component, motivation may be descriptive of any cause of a particular
behavior. 13 Although requiring discriminatory motivation and
distinguishing it from discriminatory intent might have sent the message
that the role of a protected characteristic as even an unconscious factor in
an employment decision would be prohibited, the Court's use of both
terms interchangeably seemed to erase any meaningful distinction
between them. 137 Title VII, as amended now incorporates a "motivating
factor" test for liability in "mixed motive" cases,138 but intent and its
134 Krieger, supra note 129, at 1247-48.
11 See, e.g., Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999) ("Most often...
eligibility for punitive awards is characterized in terms of a defendant's motive or intent.");
see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 986 (stating that what the plaintiff must prove in a disparate
treatment case is "discriminatory intent or motive").
13 Motive is "[slomething, esp. willful desire, that leads one to act.... Cf. 'INTENT.'"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1034 (7th ed. 1999). In other words, motive includes, but is not
limited to, the willful desire concept associated with intent. See D. Don Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60
S. CAL. L. REv. 734, 736-39 (1987) (distinguishing motive as a causal concept not necessarily
including the consciousness which accompanies intent).
1-7 Bit cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), in which the Court dearly recognized the
role of subconscious processes of stereotyping in the context of interpreting disparate
treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(1994): "Although age discrimination rarely was based on the sort of animus motivating
some other forms of discrimination, it was based in large part on stereotypes unsupported
by objective fact .. " 460 U.S. at 231.
Im 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice."). The Court initially recognized a category of cases which came to be known
as "mixed motive" cases in Price Waterhonse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1989).
Although the division between "mixed motive" cases and other kinds of disparate
treatment cases was and remains far from clear, whether a particular case qualified for
treatment as a mixed motive case depended on the presentation of evidence indicating that
the protected characteristic was at least a factor in the challenged employment decision.
See id. at 246-47 & n.12. Once it is determined that the plaintiff can satisfy this burden, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to establish as an affirmative defense that the
same decision would have been made even absent the protected characteristic. See id. at
246. In Price Waterhonse itself, the Court determined that the plaintiff had successfully
demonstrated, through evidence indicating an employer's stereotypical attitude towards
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 [2000], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol34/iss3/1
2000] FROM ASPIRATION TO ARROGANCE 469
association with conscious motivation have continued to dominate the
courts' articulations of the wrong in disparate treatment cases. 139 Indeed,
intent may be so ingrained in the public understanding of disparate
treatment discrimination that even exclusive use of motivation would
not change the message communicated. 140
The doctrinal focus on intent, in addition to demonstrating the law's
incompleteness as a response to employment inequality, tends to create
the impression that the disparate treatment discriminator is a bad
person. The courts have strengthened this impression by employing
other language vilifying the disparate treatment discriminator. After
asserting discriminatory intent as the wrong of discrimination under
disparate treatment theory, the Supreme Court, in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,141 stated that "[ulndoubtedly
disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII... .".42  By describing disparate treatment
discrimination as an "obvious evil," the Court not only depicted the
wrong as conscious but also conjured up images of the kind of blatant
bigotry practiced by "those other people" in the South, images widely
publicized during the year before the statute was enacted.143 Consistent
later use of terms like "invidious"'" as a quality of disparate treatment
discrimination' 45 and "animus" 14 as a motivation of the discriminator 47
women, that gender had influenced the decision and that the employer had failed to prove
that the woman in question would have been denied the promotion regardless of her
gender. See id. at 258.
119 See, e.g., EEOC v. Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1997); Kolstad
v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Krenik v. County of Le
Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995).
140 Moreover, as a matter of common understanding, there probably is no meaningful
distinction between the terms. Thus, the mere difference in language would have to be
accompanied by an explanation of difference in meaning in order to change the message of
the doctrine. But cf Welch, supra note 136, at 778-82 (proposing the possible effective use of
a discriminatory motive test for what constitutes discrimination under Title VII).
141 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
142 Id. at 335 n.15.
143 See BURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 72, 80-8
144 In conjunction with discrimination, "invidious" means "offensive or objectionable, esp.
because it involves prejudice or stereotyping." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 136, at
195.
145 See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979); Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977).
146 Although "animus" may be used as a synonym for "intention," it is most commonly
used to mean "ill will" or "animosity." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 86 (7th ed. 1999).
147 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 666, 668 (1987); Beazer, 440 U.S at
587.
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have helped affirm an attitude of complacency by painting a picture of
the discriminator inconsistent with what employment decision makers
see in the mirror each day.148
V. HINDSIGHT LESSONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DOCTRINAL REFORM
The development of adverse impact doctrine in the initial
interpretation of Title VII represented official recognition of an aspect of
employment inequality which neither the legislators as a group nor the
voting public apparently contemplated when the legislation was
enacted.1 49 Thus, by successfully advocating for a broad interpretation of
the statute, the EEOC may have helped to increase public awareness of
at least some of the complexity of employment inequality °50 For
purposes of analyzing language and message, a more important lesson is
to be found in how the EEOC succeeded than in the success itself. The
EEOC helped to produce a positive educational message in the doctrine
by setting forth specific guidelines to be applied in particular factual
circumstances. 15 ' Although a broad interpretation of the concept of
"discrimination" was implicit in the guidelines, they contained no
general language, arrogant in tone, about what the law accomplished. 52
Accordingly, the public language of the EEOC in this early phase
avoided sending an ambiguous message which could close minds at the
same time as it was trying, with some success, to open them.
In contrast to the guidelines and reasonable cause determinations
cited in Griggs, the EEOC's rhetoric of "equal employment opportunity,"
although similarly aimed at fostering a broad understanding of
discrimination, has communicated the arrogance affirming message that
118 Cf. Krieger, supra note 129, at 1247 (concluding that the disparate treatment doctrine
"holds the problem of intergroup bias at a safe distance, something those 'other people,'
those 'bad people' do").
149 See BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW, supra note 56, at 50-51, 73, 101-02.
'5 Although the Supreme Court modified the content of the analysis of adverse impact
discrimination from its initial formulation in Griggs in a series of controversial decisions, see
generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), and Wards Cove Packing
Co. Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the modifications were, for the most part,
legislatively overruled in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, pursuant to which the original
formulation of the analysis has been restored. 42 US.C. § 1981 (1994). Regardless of the
doctrinal modification, the consistent presence of adverse impact, as a part of employment
inequality addressed by Title VII since 1972, indicates at a minimum public acceptance of if
not support for the concept that some policies with discriminatory effects on protected
groups, even if well-intentioned, should be prohibited.
151 See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text.
1-2 See supra notes 55-87 and accompanying text.
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compliance with the law fulfills the employer's responsibility to the goal
of equal employment opportunity. In particular, the agency's extensive
publication through mandatory posting of the statement that "equal
employment opportunity is the law" has portrayed compliance with
Title VII as the solution to employment inequality, rather than as a mere
step toward addressing that very complex problem. The difference
between these two portrayals of the law's relationship to employment
inequality, although subtle in language, is significant in message. The
message of "law as solution" focuses the employer and citizens at large
on compliance, while the message of "law as step towards aspiration"
reminds them that, while compliance is important, much more work has
to be done.
The inconsistency between the message of "law as solution" and the
complexity of employment inequality, which was present from the
outset, is even more clear following the development of doctrine
interpreting discrimination. Because of the absence of definitive
language in the doctrine linking the two "types" of discrimination, the
doctrine portrays discrimination as two separate problems, rather than
as one enormous and complex problem with multiple layers. Moreover,
the description of disparate treatment discrimination as a consciously
biased act has confined public understanding of the connection between
specific personnel decisions and discrimination to the realm of conscious
bias. 15 3 The result of the combined message of "equal employment
opportunity" rhetoric and Title VII doctrine is the affirmation of an
attitude that employment inequality is someone else's problem.
Despite the myriad scholarly lamentations of the doctrinal focus on
"intent," many of which offer suggestions for doctrinal reform,154 any
153 See supra note 119.
15 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 129, at 1242 (suggesting that the requirement of intent be
replaced by requirement to show that group status "played a role" in the challenged
decision); Malamud, supra note 108, at 2232-38 (proposing that the McDonnell Douglass
proof structure be abandoned); Williams, supra note 27, at 146 (suggesting that law could
make unconscious racism conscious by criminalizing racism); Judith Olans Brown et al.,
Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrinination Law: A Modest Proposal
for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487,1531 (1997) (proposing that the courts
educate jurors about unconscious bias through jury instructions in Title VII cases); Jessie
Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrinination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1342-
43 (1995) (proposing that the courts specifically interpret the intent requirement to include
"inferred intent" and thus recognize the role of unconscious prejudice in discrimination).
But cf. Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and Disparate hnpact
Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 How. LJ. 455, 468 (1998) (suggesting that problem is
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significant change in the interpretation of discrimination appears
unlikely. The message of the doctrine is now well-established in over
twenty-five years of precedent, and the public shows no sign of
supporting legislation expanding the definition of prohibited
discrimination to include all of the ways in which employment decisions
unjustifiably contribute to workplace inequality. 55 Moreover, doctrinal
reform targeted at conduct about which the perpetrator is unaware is
unlikely to positively impact employer behavior in a way which would
promote employment equality. 56 If, as I suggest, the interpretation of
discrimination under Title VII is practically set, then the message that
Title VII is the solution to employment inequality is a particularly
harmful one, because it affirms complacency rather than the kind of self-
examination necessary for more widespread awareness of the more
subtle causes of employment inequality. This message may be the most
immediate obstacle to moving further on the path to "equal employment
opportunity." Perhaps, then, it is time to remove the obstacle and to
humbly restore "equal employment opportunity" to its rightful status as
an aspiration.
VI. THE REST OF THE DREAM
Hopeful that I will be able to rejoin the dream which my alarm
interrupted before, I manage to go back to sleep. I'm back on my porch,
my daughter and grandson are gone, it's raining and my wife and I are
watching the local news. There's some story about an employment
discrimination claim against a local employer, but I cannot make out the
details. Somewhat frustrated by the cloudiness of the television, I reach
not the requirement of intent but how discriminatory intent is defined and proposing that a
more comprehensive intent standard, which includes unconscious bias, be adopted).
15 Cf. William H. Chafe, The End of One Stnggle, The Beginning of Another, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, supra note 20, at 147 ("If the history of the civil rights
movement teaches anything, it is the importance of linking programs for change to values
that are widely shared in the dominant culture."). Public opinion regarding the importance
of the civil rights issue relative to other issues increased dramatically in the year before the
legislation's passage. See BURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 42-68.
15 Experience dictates that the most common reaction to the imposition of liability in
advance of some understanding of the wrong would be resistance and anger. See
BURSTEIN, supra note 42, at 145. Cf. Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective
Action, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 583, 593 (suggesting that the "unquestioned faith in the ability of
courts to solve complex social problems [which] underlies this focus on doctrinal
tinkering" may be misplaced). But cf. Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyisyn Defense and
Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-
Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1003 (1997) (advocating reform
of Title VII as a means of educating the white male about his privilege).
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for one of the news magazines on the coffee table. Unfortunately, I
cannot even see who's on the cover, much less what the articles are
discussing. There are two books on our bookshelves discussing the
history of affirmative action and developments in residential housing
patterns in the 21st century, but when I open them, I cannot tell what has
happened in either area since the year 2000. Although there are copies of
articles written by colleagues about Title VII doctrine, I cannot glean
from them either the current doctrine interpreting it or the existence or
status of any legislative reform efforts directed to employment
discrimination more generally. It's as if they are written in an unfamiliar
foreign language. What started out as such a clear picture of my
daughter and grandson has become a cloudy haze, and I begin to muse
in the dream about why.
Given the extent to which the general absence of bias awareness and
the arrogance of confidence in fairness permeate decision making at so
many different levels today, perhaps it is difficult even to dream of what
things might look like if some critical mass of citizens was more aware of
how individual and institutional biases lead to employment inequality
between groups. Perhaps without knowing what changes in behavior
would result from such a transformative shift in consciousness, I cannot
predict (or dream) what changes, if any, in law will be needed to create a
more just workplace.'5 7 Perhaps I am just a fool for thinking about these
things. Anxious for something tangible which I might be able to use
when I awaken, I look about the room one more time. In the corner of
my old desk, I spot what appears to be a draft of a letter, and I advance
quickly towards it. I am pleased to see that the letter, unlike so many of
the other writings in the room, is clear and legible. This is what I read:
January 1, 2000
Office of the Chair
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission'5
157 For example, current understandings of the pros and cons of affirmative action,
including its psychological impact, may have little application in a world in which the
whole notion of affirmative action is perceived differently.
1- 1801 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20507'
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Dear Chair:
I write to you today as a fellow educator concerned with the
education of our citizens regarding the manner in which race and other
characteristics like gender and national origin continue to operate as
obstacles to opportunities in employment and elsewhere, despite formal
protection of citizens within certain categories under the statute which it
is your mandate to enforce. The purpose of my letter is to offer some
thoughts on the Commission's role, not as enforcer or advocate, but as
public educator on the nature of "equal employment opportunity," with
the hope of stimulating further discussion aimed at increasing public
awareness of individual and institutional barriers to achievement of that
lofty goal. 5 9
The role the EEOC plays in creating public understanding of "equal
employment opportunity" is already significant. Through various kinds
of communications from the EEOC to employers (posters, publications,
training, etc.), the nation's citizens obtain much of their knowledge about
Title VII and "equal employment opportunity." The most prominent
communication to employees about "EEO" is the bold statement at the
top of the poster the agency requires in every covered workplace that
"equal employment opportunity is the law." This phrase suggests that
an employer's compliance with Title VII and the other laws mentioned in
the poster ensures equality of employment opportunity in that
employer's workplace. 160 The widespread use of the acronym "EEO" to
describe everything from forms issued by the Commission1 6' to
employers, their policies and officers reinforces the message equating
legal compliance with equal employment opportunity.
My concern is that the message that "equal employment opportunity
is the law" has been and continues to be an impediment to improved
public understanding of the complexity of continuing workplace
inequality. To the extent citizens perceive that the law has created or
will create a true level playing field in the workplace, they are less likely
to learn about how they may contribute to employment inequality in
ways which legal doctrine does not address. Stated more simply, the
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
161 Clearly, this represents a literal interpretation of the language, but the vast majority of
citizens who read the language lack sufficient familiarity with legal rhetoric to read the
language any differently.
1,1 See, e.g., Employer Information Report (EEO-1 Form), 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 441:273-
74 (Fair Empl. Prac. Manual 1997).
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danger of articulating current law as the solution to inequality of
workplace opportunity is that it seems to promote complacency, rather
than to encourage the kind of self-examination and awareness which are
needed for the nation's workplaces to move closer to the aspiration of
equal employment opportunity. That aspiration, in a sense, is being
erased by its synonymousness with what the law does.
Given the absence of a consensus awareness of the degree to which
characteristics like race, gender and national origin continue to impact
employment opportunity, immediate attention to doctrinal reform of
Title VII appears futile and in any event an ineffective means of
increasing that awareness. The immediate danger is that continued
affirmation of the arrogant belief that workplace inequality will be
eliminated by a statute enacted in 1964 will only further widen the
divide between ethnic groups and reduce the possibility of working
together toward real equality of opportunity in the workplace. The
immediate challenge, then, for the Commission is to determine how it
can continue advocating for the broadest coverage of Title VII possible
while avoiding the transmission of a message which affirms
complacency within the regulated community about equality. A couple
of brief avenues are suggested for further discussion and development.
First, the Commission should try to reassert "equal employment
opportunity" as a distant aspiration and goal towards which Title VII is
directed. An important initial step would be changing the EEO
Consolidated Poster's heading from "equal employment opportunity is
the law" to "discrimination is against the law." The new phrase would
use the law's language and more accurately depict what the law actually
does-prohibit discrimination, not create equal employment opportunity.
At the bottom of the poster could be added in the same sized print as the
heading: "Aspire to work for equal employment opportunity in your
workplace." This addition at the end of the poster would send the
message that equal employment opportunity is a long term aspiration to
which employers and employees alike should be dedicated. A policy
statement explaining the reasons for the change should accompany the
announcement of the change and the delivery of the new language.162
162 The policy statement could perhaps include some brief perspective on the legacy of the
civil rights movement and the pervasiveness of unequal treatment in American society.
Some enduring quotations from civil rights speeches or writings might be appropriate to
communicate "the dream" of equal employment opportunity in the real life context from
which it was born. See D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title V11, Equality, and the Fin
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Second, the agency could become even more involved in
encouraging institutions to invest in training designed to increase their
employees' awareness of different cultural perspectives and their own
culturally transmitted biases. Several government publications listing
the numerous private organizations engaged in this work and describing
their services are available 63, and the agency could start by simply
making employers aware of the availability and importance of this type
of training. The agency has an opportunity here both to enhance its
educative function regarding discrimination and to encourage the
regulated community to engage in the kind of self-analysis which is
necessary to further the aspiration of equal opportunity in employment.
As an important outgrowth of these kinds of measures, greater
consensus support may be built for the position the agency has already
taken on affirmative action. These measures will not end discrimination
or level the playing field, but, in helping to build greater awareness of
how far away these goals are, they might just restore some hope that the
goals are worth working for.
Best of luck to you in your continuing important work.
Very truly yours,
Barclay D. Beery'6
5342 Coliseum St.
New Orleans, LA 70115
De Siede, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2368 (1994) (suggesting that we need to adjust the
language of the discourse of equality, developing "perhaps a new canon in which Ellison
and Delany, Du Bois and Malcolm, Douglass and Franklin take center stage").
11,3 The President's Initiative on Race has identified numerous organizations across the
country which are engaged in facilitating greater consciousness of self through the
perspectives of others. See ADVISORY BOARD'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 32, at
app. Hi-I to HI-45.
164 The dream continues .... Long live the dream.
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